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DEEPWATER HORIZON NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGES ASSESSMENT: WHERE DOES THE
MONEY GO?
Nicholas J. Lund* and Niki L. Pace**

I. INTRODUCTION
The effort to assess and remediate the environmental effects of the
Deepwater Horizon Spill (the Spill) began while the oil was still gushing
and will continue for many years. Recognizing that the Spill would
cause profound damage to both the Gulf’s natural resources and to the
livelihoods of Gulf residents who depend on those natural resources, the
federal government undertook a natural resource damage assessment
(NRDA) just weeks after the Spill began.1

* Nicholas J. Lund is the Ocean and Coastal Law Fellow at the National Sea Grant
Law Center at the University of Mississippi. He received his J.D. at the University of
Maine School of Law. This research was funded under award number
NA09OAR4170200 from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
U.S. Department of Commerce.
The statements, findings, conclusions, and
recommendations are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of
NOAA or the U.S. Department of Commerce.
** Niki L. Pace is a Research Counsel with the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal
Program and Adjunct Professor at the University of Mississippi School of Law. She
received her J.D and L.L.M. in Environmental and Natural Resources Law from Lewis &
Clark Law School. This research was funded under award number NA10OAR4170078
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce. The statements, findings, conclusions, and recommendations are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of NOAA or the U.S. Department of
Commerce.
1. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)’s Damage
Assessment Remediation and Restoration Program (DARP) began the Preliminary
Assessment Phase of the NRDA on April 20, 2010. NRDA By The Numbers, NAT’L
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2010/12/FINAL-NRDA-by-the-Numbers-for-12-1-10.pdf (last visited
Jan. 20, 2011).
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The idea behind natural resource damage provisions is for the
responsible party to do what is necessary to make the environment
“whole” again, as if the accident never happened.2 In what is certain to
be the largest NRDA undertaken under any statute, the task of making
the Gulf “whole again” will last long after outrage sparked by the Spill
has faded from the public mind. Although it will take a long time, it will
be important to follow the Deepwater Horizon NRDA process through to
its completion to ensure the damaged natural resources are cared for.
This Article examines the last phases of the NRDA process outlined
in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).3 After the initial, comprehensive
Preassessment phase, NRDA Trustees are responsible for developing a
Restoration Plan, collecting money from the responsible parties, and
finally, implementing restoration projects. This Article explores the
requirements and experiences of the money collection and restoration
implementation phases of an OPA NRDA and discusses some of the
controversies and uncertainties involved in the collection and distribution
of restoration money.
II. NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES
The idea that natural resources themselves had value and, if harmed,
damages could be recovered for that harm in court was not popular until
the environmental movement of the early 1970s. Since then, natural
resource damage provisions have expanded in scope, and increased in
use, becoming an important part of five federal environmental statutes.4
Because fundamental similarities exist in all NRDA provisions,
following the development of NRDAs from their inception helps frame
their intent and direction.

2. 15 C.F.R. § 990.10 (2010); see also Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural
Resource Damages: Closing a Gap in Federal Environmental Law, 24 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 851, 853 (1989) (comparing the natural resource damage doctrine to tort law, which
seeks to make the victim “whole” again).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2010).
4. Currently, the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA), the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), National Marine Sanctuary Act, and the Park System Resource Protection
Act offer NRD recovery. CAROL E. DINKINS, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES LITIGATION
1-5 (2010).
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A. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
The idea of a public cause of action for injury to natural resources—
making the polluters pay for their harm—began with the bloom of
landmark environmental legislation in the early 1970s. Its earliest roots
are found in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973
(TAPAA), which held pipeline right-of-way holders “strictly liable to all
damaged parties . . . without regard to ownership of any affected lands,
structures, fish, wildlife, or biotic or other natural resources relied upon
by Alaska Natives, Native organizations, or others for subsistence or
economic purposes.”5 TAPAA also held transporters of oil liable “for all
damages, including clean-up costs, sustained by any person or entity,
public or private.”6
Though TAPAA was not a pure natural resource damage cause of
action because it emphasized the recovery of economic damages,
TAPAA did establish a framework for natural resource damage recovery
that would become a staple in later iterations. For instance, the statute
mandated interim payments, requiring the responsible party to “provide
emergency subsistence and other aid to an affected Alaska Native,
Native organization, or other person pending expeditious filing of, and
determination of, a claim.”7 Additionally, TAPAA established a
Liability Fund (Fund) to pay for clean-up costs while liability was being
determined.8 The Fund was originally paid for by a small tax on oil
pumped into tanker ships.9 Such funds would be a staple of later NRD
provisions.
Under TAPAA, injured parties would simply submit a claim
containing the circumstances of their injury, a list of the damages, an
accounting of the damages incurred and proof of property ownership to
the Fund.10 Unlike subsequent NRD provisions, the valuation of
damaged natural resources —a tricky problem even today—was left to
the victim rather than a government representative acting as a trustee.
From there, the Fund’s representatives would present the claim to the
responsible party, who could then settle with the injured party or dispute
a claim and submit to arbitration.11 TAPAA did not include an explicit
5. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a) (1982); see also Breen, supra note 2, at 855.
6. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153(c)(1), 87 Stat. 567,
586 (1973); see also Breen, supra note 2, at 855.
7. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(4).
8. 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (2010).
9. Pub. L. No. 93-153(c)(5) (Title II), 87 Stat. at 587.
10. 43 C.F.R. § 29.9(a)-(b) (1977).
11. Id. § 29.9(c)(1), 29.9(h).
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requirement that sums requested for the loss of natural resources be used
to recover those natural resources, which is included in later NRD
provisions.
B. The Deepwater Port Act of 1974
The cause of action for the recovery for natural resource damages
was expanded in its next appearance, the Deepwater Port Act of 1974
(DPA).12 The DPA created liability for damages “suffered by any
person, or involving . . . the natural resources of the marine environment,
or the coastal environment.”13 Congress was up front about its desire to
protect the natural resources themselves, stating that the purpose behind
the statute was to “provide for the protection of the marine and coastal
environment to prevent or minimize any adverse impact which might
occur as a consequence of the development of [deepwater] ports.”14
The DPA emphasized its environmental awareness and separated
itself from TAPAA in a few ways. First, it separated “damages” from
“cleanup costs,” allowing recovery for “damages . . . suffered by . . . the
natural resources of the marine environment, or the coastal environment
of any nation” in addition to the actual costs of cleaning up the spill.15
Second, the DPA allowed a public official to act as a trustee on behalf of
the public in order to recover natural resource damages, and specified
that those damages could only be “applied to the restoration and
rehabilitation of such natural resources by the appropriate agencies of
Federal or State government.”16 This burgeoning recognition that the
environment itself—not just human reliance on it—had worth, paved the
way for all subsequent natural resource damages provisions.
C. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“Clean Water Act”)
Congress seized the opportunity to expand upon the DPA’s
somewhat limited scope in crafting amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, creating the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA).
Following the DPA’s lead, the CWA expanded polluters’ liability to
include natural resource damages, permitting trustees to recover “any
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
856.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976).
Id. § 1517(m)(2); see also Breen, supra note 2, at 856.
Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-627(2)(a)(2), 88 Stat. 2126, 2126 (1975).
Id. at 93-627, § 18(m)(2), 88 Stat. 2145 (1975).
Id. at 93-627, § 18(i)(3), 88 Stat. 2144 (1975); see also Breen, supra note 2, at

2011] Deepwater Horizon Natural Resource Damages Assessment

331

costs or expenses incurred by the Federal Government or any State
government in the restoration or replacement of natural resources
damaged or destroyed as a result of . . . oil or a hazardous substance”
spilled into navigable waters.17
The CWA amendments also installed the requirement that “[s]ums
recovered shall be used to restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent
of such natural resources by the appropriate agencies of the Federal
Government, or the State government.”18 This provision is noteworthy
not only because it requires recovered sums to be used solely for natural
resource restoration, but because it allows states as well as the Federal
government to serve as trustees and bring lawsuits.
D. The Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA)
Enacted in 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Recovery,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund) is the closest
blueprint for the statutory scheme being used for the Deepwater Horizon
Spill NRDA. CERCLA expanded the reach of NRD statutes far beyond
oil spills, establishing liability for “injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources” resulting from the release of hazardous substances.19
CERCLA lists more than 800 chemicals as hazardous if released.20
Further, CERCLA included a broader definition of “natural resources”
than previous laws, extending liability to injury to “land, fish, wildlife,
biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such
resources” belonging to or controlled by the United States.21 Following
the lead of the CWA, CERCLA limits NRD recoveries to the cost of
“restoration, rehabilitation, or replacement or acquiring the equivalent of
any natural resources injured.”22 The resulting statute “provides the most
extensive legal framework for NRD recoveries”23 and has “virtually
dominated environmental law since its enactment.”24
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4) (2006); see also Laura Rowley, NRD Trustees: To What
Extent Are They Truly Trustees?, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 459, 461 (2001).
18. 33. U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (2006).
19. Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(4)(C) (2006).
20. CERCLA Hazardous Substances, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/hazsubs/cercsubs.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16).
22. Id. § 9611(c)(2).
23. Rowley, supra note 17, at 463.
24. Breen, supra note 2, at 860.
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In addition to greatly expanding the scope of natural resource
damage recovery, CERCLA expanded and clarified a NRDA’s final
phase: the implementation of restoration projects and the recovery of the
environment. The Department of the Interior (DOI), responsible for
implementing CERCLA, breaks the NRDA process into three stages:
Preassessment (which contains a Preassessment Screen step, sometimes
considered a separate stage), Assessment, and Post-Assessment.25
During the Preassessment stage, federal or state trustees (in the model
pioneered by the DPA) first conduct a Preassessment Screen consisting
of a “rapid review of readily available information” to determine whether
or not a NRDA is required.26 If the screen is resolved in the positive, the
next step in the Preassessment phase is “notification, coordination and
emergency activities.”27
The DOI provides two paths for the next phase, Assessment,
depending on the severity of the spill or release. Type A assessments
regulate procedures for “simplified assessments requiring minimal field
observation to determine damages.”28 Type B assessments are intended
for larger, more complex spills where a determination of “the type and
extent of short- and long-term injury and damages” is necessary.29
Reflecting the complexity of the event these assessments are employed
for, Type B assessments themselves are split into three parts: Injury
Determination, Quantification, and Damage Determination.30
The Injury Determination phase serves to establish the harm and
determine causation to the responsible party.31 The Quantification phase,
a more technical step, seeks to identify the extent of the loss of the
resource’s services, and provides guidelines for “establishing baseline
conditions, estimating recovery periods, and measuring the degree of
service reduction stemming from an injury to a natural resource.”32
Finally, the Damage Determination phase tackles the difficult job of
assigning a dollar value to the injuries established in the Quantification

25. 43 C.F.R. § 11.13(b)-(f) (2010). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
NRDA website considers DOI’s regulations, including the Preassessment Screen, as its
own step. Natural Resource Damage Assessment, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/nrd/nrda2.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
26. 43 C.F.R. § 11.13(b) (2010).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 11.14(ss).
29. Id. § 11.14(tt).
30. Id. § 11.13(e)(1)-(3).
31. Id. § 11.13(e)(1).
32. Id. § 11.13(e)(2).
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phase.33 This type of natural resource valuation is one of the most
controversial and oft-discussed aspects of the NRDA process in any
statute.34
The final phase, Post-Assessment, covers the collection of money
from the responsible party and the processes of putting those sums
towards the restoration of the environment. This phase begins with the
trustee creating a Report of Assessment detailing Assessment
information and, if using a Type B Assessment, detailed information
regarding the Injury Determination, Quantification, and Damage
Determination steps.35
Next, the trustee presents the potentially
responsible party (PRP) with a written demand for the determined
damages.36 The trustee’s assessment has the force of a rebuttable
presumption, challengeable by the PRP in an administrative hearing.37
The PRP has sixty days to acknowledge receipt before the trustees can
file suit.38
Once sums are recovered, they are placed into an account used solely
for that purpose.39 Finally, after the natural resources damages claim
amount is determined, the trustee must write a Restoration Plan outlining
“how the monies will be used to address natural resources, specifically

33. Id. § 11.13(e)(3).
34. See, e.g., Melissa Daigle, The Value of a Pelican: An Overview of the Natural
Resource Damage Assessment Under Federal Law and Louisiana Law, 16 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 253 (2011); Ronald M. Pierce, Valuing the Environment: NOAA’s New
Regulations Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 167 (1994); Susan A.
Austin, The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Proposed Rules for
Natural Resource Damage Assessment Under the Oil Pollution Act, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 549 (1994). The original version of CERCLA came under fire for undervaluing
natural resources, requiring trustees to limit natural resource damages to the “lesser of (1)
the cost of restoring or replacing the equivalent of the injured resource or (2) the lost use
value of the resource.” Gina M. Lambert & Anthony R. Chase, Remedying CERCLA’s
Natural Resource Damages Provision: Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine Into
Natural Resource Damage Actions, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 353, 361 (1992). The Supreme
Court found that this “lesser-of” rule was impermissible, determining that Congress
intended the DOI to use restoration costs as the measure of recovery. Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t
of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 444-59 (D.C. Cir. 1989). DOI regulations now include more
guidance for natural resource valuation. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (2010).
35. 43 C.F.R. § 11.90 (2010).
36. Id. § 11.91(a).
37. Id. § 11.91(c).
38. Id. § 11.91(d).
39. Id. § 11.92(a). The account lies within the U.S. Treasury when the Federal
government is the trustee, and in the State treasury where a state is the trustee. Id. §
11.92(a)(1)-(2).
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what restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of equivalent
resources will occur.”40
CERCLA laid the groundwork for modern NRD recoveries, and for
the first time contemplated restorations for events on the scale of the
Exxon-Valdez Spill and the Deepwater Horizon Spill. CERCLA
specifically excluded oil from its list of hazardous substances, with
authority for that substance landing first with the CWA and then, spurred
by the Exxon-Valdez Spill, with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.41 The
OPA’s NRDA provisions are very similar to those developed for
CERCLA, and it is under the OPA that federal and state officials are
conducting the NRDA for the Deepwater Horizon Spill.
III. PRELIMINARY PHASES OF NRDA IN THE OIL POLLUTION ACT
OF 1990
As mentioned previously, OPA’s NRDA provisions are similar in
most respects to those of the CWA and CERCLA. As with those
statutes, the OPA permits authorized representatives of Indian tribes and
of federal, state, or foreign governments to act as trustees of natural
resources.42 The OPA builds upon the CWA and CERCLA, though, in
allowing the coordination of two or more trustees and permitting the
designation of a “Lead Administrative Trustee.”43 The OPA also
establishes a liability fund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund), to
handle immediate clean-up costs and NRD assessment costs.44
40. Id. § 11.93(a).
41. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2010)).
42. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b)(1) (2010). The Federal Government’s trustees for the
Deepwater Horizon Spill are NOAA, DOI, and the Department of Defense. Resource
Restoration Planning Process Begins for BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,
RESTORETHEGULF.GOV (Sept. 29, 2010, 2:13 PM), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/release/
2010/09/29/resource-restoration-planning-process-begins-bpdeepwater-horizon-oil-spill.
The state trustees are: the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
and the Geological Survey of Alabama; the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection; the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality; the Louisiana
Department of Environment of Wildlife and Fisheries, the Louisiana Department of
Natural Resources, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, the Louisiana
Oil Spill Coordinator’s Office, and the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authority; and, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality, and the Texas General Land Office. Id.
43. 15 C.F.R. § 990.14(a)(1) (2010); Kevin R. Murray et al., Natural Resource
Damage Trustees: Whose Side Are They Really On?, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 407, 417 (1999).
44. 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509 (2010). The Fund is stocked by an environmental fee on
petroleum as well as by provisions of the OPA, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
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The OPA holds polluters liable for clean-up costs and an array of
damages resulting from the spill of oil. All removal costs incurred by the
U.S., a state or an Indian tribe are covered, as are removal costs taken by
any person that are consistent with the National Contingency Plan.45 The
OPA defines “damages” to include injury to natural resources; real or
personal property; subsistence use; revenues; profits and earning
capacity; and public services.46 The OPA sets a cap of $75 million on
liability for offshore facilities like the Deepwater Horizon rig, but BP
agreed to waive that cap voluntarily as the scale of the spill was
recognized.47 Additionally, BP set up a $20 billion fund using the OPA’s
interims-claims process to handle individual spill damages claims,
leaving the NRDA collection to the trustees.48
While the DOI is responsible for implementing CERCLA, the OPA
requires regulations for oil spill NRDAs to be crafted by the Commerce
Department’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).49 Again taking cues from CERCLA, NOAA’s regulations
separate the OPA’s NRDA process into three distinct steps:
Preassessment, Restoration Planning, and Restoration Implementation.50
A. Preassessment
The purpose of the Preassessment phase is to “provide a process by
which trustees determine if they have jurisdiction to pursue restoration

the DPA, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA) and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments. Id. § 9509(b). Note that the OPA deviates
from CERCLA here, which does not allow NRD assessment costs to be reimbursed by
Superfund. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(b)(2) (2006); Murray, supra note 41, at 416-17.
45. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) (2006). The National Contingency Plan, officially known
as The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, was created
in 1968 as a blueprint for responding to oil spills and hazardous substance releases.
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan Overview, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm
(last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2) (2006).
47. Id. § 2704(a)(3); Tom Hals, BP Tells Court It Waives Cap On Spill Liability,
Oct.
19,
2010,
available
at
REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1911373420101019.
48. Laurel Brubaker Calkins & Margaret Cronin Fisk, BP’s $20 Billion Fund May Not
Stop Spill Lawsuits, Judge Says, BLOOMBERG, June 18, 2010, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-17/bp-s-20-billion-fund-may-not-stop-spilllawsuits-new-orleans-judge-says.html.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(e)(1) (2006).
50. 15 C.F.R. § 990.12 (2010).
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under OPA and, if so, whether it is appropriate to do so.”51 Trustees
begin the formal process by determining whether an incident has
occurred that threatens natural resources under the trusteeship of the
trustees.52 If it is determined that the incident will cause injuries and that
response actions will adequately address the injuries, trustees prepare a
Notice of Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning and release it to the
public and to potentially responsible parties.53 Reflecting the emphasis
on transparency and public participation in the OPA, the administrative
record amassed by the trustees is made available to the public to
document the basis for the decision to proceed with a NRDA.54
B. Restoration Planning
Restoration Planning is the most difficult and time-consuming aspect
of an OPA NRDA. It provides a process for trustees to “evaluate and
quantify potential injuries . . . and use that information to determine the
need for and scale of restoration actions.”55 After the formal steps of
identifying the nature of the injury and establishing the causation
between the release of oil and the injury, the process of collecting data on
the injury and on the baseline conditions that existed before the injury
begins.56 This has been a major undertaking for Deepwater Horizon
responders. Since its NRDA response began on April 20, 2010, NOAA
has:
[d]ocumented 2,263 visibly oiled dead birds; 2,079 visibly oiled
live birds; 18 visibly oiled dead sea turtles; and 456 visibly oiled
live sea turtles . . . collected 29,599 environmental samples for
analysis . . . conducted 37,183 NRDA analyses . . . logged
34,786 images . . . surveyed about 4,000 linear miles of shoreline
. . . [and] deployed several hundred transmitters in wide-ranging
species . . . to detect changes in species behavior, reproductive
patterns and mortality.57
Once the information is collected, trustees must begin restoration
determinations. These restoration options include combinations of
51. Id. § 990.40.
52. Id. § 990.41(a).
53. Id. § 990.44.
54. Id. § 990.45.
55. Id. § 990.50.
56. Id. § 990.51. Baseline is “the condition of the natural resources and services that
would have existed had the incident not occurred.” Id. § 990.30.
57. NRDA BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 1.
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primary restoration (actions to directly restore the injured resources,
including a natural recovery alternative) and compensatory restoration
(“restoration activities that provide services of the same type and quality,
and of comparable value as those injured”).58 Compensatory restoration
must be considered if, as in the Spill, the injury involves the loss of
natural resource services (i.e. a public beach closed due to oil) pending
restoration.59 These options may be considered with the aim that, as a
package, they would “make the environment and public whole.”60
Next, trustees must determine the scale of restoration activities.61
The process of “scaling” “refers to the process of determining, for
identified restoration actions, the size or scale of the actions that would
be required” to return the natural resource to baseline conditions and
compensate the public.62 In other words, an adjustment “for the time it
will take replacement services to fully develop.”63 When scaling the
restoration projects, trustees must consider a “service-to-service”
approach, which provides natural resources and services of the same type
and quality and of comparable value as those lost, but may resort to a
valuation approach (determined using dollars or units of resource
service) if service-to-service is inappropriate.64 Restoration actions may
be discounted due to natural restoration occurring in the interim or to
uncertainty.65
Once the trustees lay out a range of restoration alternatives they
evaluate them based on six factors: cost, effectiveness, likelihood of
success, extent to which the alternative will prevent future harm, multiresource benefits, and the effects on public health and safety.66 The
trustees will use these criteria to develop a list of preferred restoration
alternatives.67 If two or more alternatives are equally preferable, the
trustees will select the most cost-effective alternative.68 Trustees may
58. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(c)(2) (2010).
59. James S. Seevers, Jr., NOAA’s New Natural Resource Damage Assessment
Scheme: It’s Not About Collecting Money, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1513, 1540 (1996).
60. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(a)(2) (2010).
61. Id. § 990.53(d).
62. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND RESTORATION PROGRAM, NOAA, NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: SCALING COMPENSATORY RESTORATION
ACTIONS (OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990) vii (1997), available at
http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/library/pdf/scaling.pdf.
63. Seevers, supra note 59, at 1541.
64. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d) (2010); Seevers, supra note 59, at 1541.
65. 15 C.F.R. § 990.53(d)(4) (2010).
66. Id. § 990.54(a).
67. Id. § 990.54(b).
68. Id.
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select a pre-existing Regional Restoration Plan or other existing
restoration project if such a plan or project is found to be the preferred
alternative.69
The final step in the Restoration Planning Phase is the development
of a Draft Restoration Plan. OPA regulations are clear that this Plan
must be developed with an opportunity for public review and comment.70
The Draft Restoration Plan should include: a summary of injury
assessment procedures used; a full description of the extent of the
injuries resulting from the incident; the goals and objectives of
restoration; “the range of restoration alternatives considered, and a
discussion of how such alternatives were developed”; an identification of
the preferred alternatives; a description of responsible party involvement
in the assessment; and “a description of monitoring for documenting
restoration effectiveness, including performance criteria.”71 After public
involvement, the trustees develop the Final Restoration Plan.72
IV. RESTORATION IMPLEMENTATION
In the final stage of a NRDA conducted under the OPA, the Trustees
present the Final Restoration Plan to the responsible parties, collect the
natural resource damages, and begin carrying out restoration projects.
As with most large-scale lawsuits, the process is laborious. Years can
pass between an incident and the conclusion of restoration activities,
even for relatively minor incidents. For example, an NRDA conducted
for a September 1998 oil spill in Lake Grand Ecaille, Louisiana, that
exposed 1,233 acres of wetlands to oil did not result in a final
Restoration Plan until November 2005, and the case did not settle until
January 2006, more than seven years after the incident.73 Even when
settlement occurs relatively quickly (within four years, typically),

69. Id. § 990.56(a).
70. Id. § 990.55(a).
71. Id. § 990.55(b)(1).
72. Id. § 990.55(d).
73. Damage Assessment, Remediation & Restoration Program, Case: Equinox, LA,
NOAA, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/southeast/equinox/index.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2011). It is important to note that the affected marsh was “fully functioning or recovering
to baseline function within six months after the discharge.” FINAL DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
AND RESTORATION PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: EQUINOX OIL COMPANY
CRUDE OIL DISCHARGE, LAKE GRANDE ECAILLE, LOUISIANA, SEPTEMBER 22, 1998, at 5
(2006), available
at
http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/southeast/equinox/pdf/Equinox_
Final_DARP_103105.pdf.
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restoration activities may not be completed for a full decade.74 The
Deepwater Horizon NRDA is certain to far eclipse all previous incidents
in scale, complexity, and cost. Creating a Restoration Plan that is able to
“make the environment and public whole again” in a reasonable time
will be a monumental challenge.
The process is rather straightforward, and begins with the closing of
the administrative record.75 Trustees cannot add documents to the
administrative record after this point unless they: “[a]re offered by
interested parties that did not receive . . . notice of the Draft Restoration
Plan . . . ; [d]o not duplicate information already contained in the
administrative record; and [r]aise significant issues regarding the Final
Restoration Plan.”76
Trustees must present the responsible parties with a written demand
requiring the responsible party to either “implement the Final Restoration
Plan subject to trustee oversight and reimburse the trustees” for their
costs, or advance to the trustees a sum representing all trustee costs of
assessment and restoration.77 The demand includes a request for
reimbursement of reasonable assessment costs, the costs of any
emergency restoration, and interest.78 The statute defines “reasonable
assessment costs” to include “administrative costs, legal costs, and other
costs necessary to carry out [assessments]; monitoring and oversight
costs; costs associated with public participation; and indirect costs that
are necessary to carry out this part.”79
Responsible parties have ninety days to respond in writing either by
paying assessment costs or providing binding assurance of payment.80 If
the responsible parties do not agree to the demand within that time,
trustees can either file a judicial action for damages or present the unpaid
claim to the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.81

74. Restoration was not completed for the January 1996 spill in North Cape, R.I., until
June 2006. Damage Assessment, Remediation & Restoration Program, Case: North
Cape, RI, NOAA, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/northeast/north_cape/index.html (last
visited Jan. 20, 2011); Department of Environmental Management, State of Rhode Island,
North Cape Oil Spill Trustees and Industry Successfully Complete North Cape Lobster
(Aug.
10,
2010),
Restoration
Program,
RHODEISLAND.GOV
http://www.dem.ri.gov/news/2006/pr/0810061.htm.
75. 15 C.F.R. § 990.61 (2010).
76. Id. § 990.61(a)(1)-(3).
77. Id. § 990.62(a)-(b).
78. Id. § 990.62(e)(6).
79. Id. § 990.30.
80. Id. § 990.62(d).
81. Id. § 990.64(a).
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Recovered funds are placed in a revolving trust account.82 When
there are multiple trustees, a joint account can be created with
enforceable agreements to govern their management.83 The funds may
be deposited in an interest-bearing account so long as all accrued interest
is used for restoration.84 “Trustees must maintain appropriate accounting
and reporting procedures for the funds.”85 Once a claim is settled,
trustees are encouraged to consider several actions to facilitate the
implementation of restoration, including the establishment of a trustee
committee to coordinate among affected trustees; the development of
more detailed implementation workplans; monitoring and oversight of
restoration; and restoration evaluation.86
The NRDA provisions in the OPA, like all NRDA provisions, are
specific in their intent to make natural resource restoration the only goal.
However, there is a temptation for trustees to stray from this noble goal.
Some argue even further that “[t]he potential [for trustees] to abuse their
authority and breach their fiduciary duties . . . is ever present due to a
lack of oversight and the substantial deference with which courts tend to
accord settlements that trustees reach with PRPs.”87 We will explore
some of these potential controversies facing the Deepwater Horizon
NRDA in the next section.
V. POTENTIAL CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING RECOVERY AND
RESTORATION
The national media attention and public outrage that followed the
Spill through the summer of 2010 has already waned. It will likely be
years before a Final Restoration Plan is complete and a settlement has
been reached. In the meantime, the process of selecting restoration
options and developing the Final Restoration Plan will take place largely
out of the public eye. The combination of factors involved with the
Deepwater Horizon NRDA—the large amount of money involved, the
length of time needed to develop a restoration plan, the bureaucracy, and
the relative difficulty in weighing environmental projects—creates a
situation where the potential exists for trustees to stray from the explicit
goal of an OPA NRDA: “the return of the injured natural resources . . . to
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. § 990.65(a).
Id. § 990.65(b).
Id. § 990.65(c).
15 C.F.R. § 990.65(e).
Id. § 990.66(a).
Murray, supra note 43, at 423.
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baseline.”88 The rest of this Article will be spent exploring potential
controversies that may arise as the Deepwater Horizon NRDA moves
into its final stage, including: emergency restoration projects, legal costs,
the degree of connection between the injured resources and restoration
projects, and the disbursement of funds.
A. Emergency Restoration Projects
There is an understandable desire to begin the Spill restoration
activities as soon as possible. Unlike a smaller, localized spill, the
Deepwater Horizon Spill affected wide swaths of coastline and habitat,
potentially threatening entire populations of wildlife. For instance,
during bi-annual trips along the Mississippi Flyway, millions of
waterfowl and shorebirds rely on coastal marshes in the Gulf Coast for
food and shelter. Waiting to take action to either restore marshes and
coastal areas or provide other habitat could prove devastating to
enormous numbers of birds.
The OPA permits trustees to conduct emergency restoration
activities while the NRDA process is still ongoing so long as emergency
action is required “to avoid irreversible loss of natural resources or to
prevent or reduce any continuing danger to natural resources.”89
Additionally, the statute requires that “[t]he action will not be undertaken
by the lead response agency; [t]he action is feasible and likely to
succeed,” delaying the action would result in increased damages to
natural resources, and “[t]he costs of the action are not unreasonable.”90
The trustees must notify responsible parties of any emergency
actions, and invite them to participate.91 Additionally, to “the extent
practicable,” trustees must provide the public with notice of the
emergency action.92 “Within a reasonable time frame after completion”
of the emergency action, the trustees must also “provide public notice of
the justification for, [the] nature and extent of, and [the] results of the
emergency” action.93
Additionally, several environmental restoration and improvement
plans already exist for the Gulf, potentially supplying trustees with a
88. 15 C.F.R. § 990.10.
89. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(j)(2) (2006). Note that emergency restoration projects are
separate and distinct from “clean-up” or “removal” projects taking place during the
immediate aftermath of the incident and not covered by NRDA.
90. 15 C.F.R. § 990.26(a).
91. Id. § 990.26(c).
92. Id. § 990.26(d).
93. Id.
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range of pre-developed restoration projects. For example, existing plans
for the state of Mississippi include the Mississippi Coastal Improvement
Plan (MSCIP), a “$1.2 billion comprehensive program for coastal
Mississippi consisting of structural, non-structural, and environmental
project elements” related to hurricane and storm damage reduction and
wildlife preservation;94 a program created under the Gulf of Mexico
Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA) that conducts coastal
protection and restoration activities;95 and projects from the Gulf of
Mexico Alliance (GOMA), a group of Gulf state governors seeking to
“improve the health of coastal ecosystems and economies of the Gulf.”96
Louisiana is working to “expedite the expenditure of about $40 million
in state and federal Coastal Wetlands Planning Protection and
Restoration Act funds” to be put towards barrier island restoration.97
The first Gulf restoration project to take place under the OPA’s
“emergency restoration” provisions98 was announced in December
2010.99 Funded initially by MDEQ (Mississippi’s lead NRDA trustee)
and carried out by the MS Department of Wildlife, Fisheries & Parks
(MDWFP), the project is set to improve 2,500 acres of wetlands at the
Howard Miller and Malmaison WMAs near Rolling Fork, Mississippi.100
It is expected that the mudflats and shallow water habitat will provide
foraging and resting habitat for migrating shorebirds and ducks, at a cost
of around $180,000.101 According to MDWFP officials, species such as
northern pintail ducks will leave potentially-disturbed habitat in

94. MISSISSIPPI COASTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM (MSCIP), http://www.mgomc.org/
index.php/programs/mississippi-coastal-improvement-program-mscip (last visited Jan.
26, 2011).
95. Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, 120 Stat. 3001
(2006).
96. GULF OF MEXICO ALLIANCE (GOMA), http://www.mgomc.org/index.php/
programs/ gulf-of-mexico-alliance-goma (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
97. Press Release, Governor Bobby Jindal, Governor Jindal Announces Agreement
with BP for Seafood Safety, Coastal Restoration & Tourism Funding (Nov. 1, 2010)
available at http://www.gov.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=
2&articleID=2550&navID=12.
98. See 15 C.F.R. § 990.62(e)(6) (2010).
99. Press Release, Miss. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, MDEQ Launches Expedited
Restoration Project (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.deq.state.ms.us/
newweb/MDEQPres.nsf/28ce80ddea27fe0886256b28006d8a70/47036a903e9293008625
77fb005a42d9?OpenDocument
100. See E-mail from Ed Penny, Waterfowl Program Coordinator, Miss. Dep’t of
Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks, to author (Jan. 24, 2011, 11:17 EST) (on file with author).
101. Id.
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southeast Louisiana to utilize newly-flooded habitat in the Mississippi
Delta.102
There is little precedent in the use of OPA’s emergency restoration
regulations.103 One of the few recent examples is the aftermath of the
April 2006 grounding of the T/V Margara near Tallaboa, Puerto Rico.
There, the 748-foot tanker ran aground three miles offshore, injuring
over 8,400 square meters of coral-covered seafloor and threatening to
spill its 300,000 barrel load of fuel oil.104 After the “clean-up” work (i.e.
floating the ship and returning it to harbor) was complete, trustees
determined that emergency restoration was warranted because
“[a]ntifoulant paint remnants with toxic constituents covered some
disturbed areas . . . [l]oose and buried reef biota were at risk of imminent
loss due to further movement or burial, remobilization of rubble,
potential hurricanes in the 2006 season, and a potential coral bleaching
event.”105 The public was notified via press release of the trustees’
decision to undertake emergency restoration.106 The process went
smoothly, and trustees continually released information on the progress
and completion of emergency actions, including a post-hurricane check

102. Id. I feel compelled to note that only twenty-three individual ducks, and no
northern pintails, were found dead in the wake of the Spill. Bird Impact Data from DOIERDC Database Download 14 Dec. 2010, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/home/dhoilspill/pdfs/Bird%20Data%20Species%20Spreadsheet%20
12142010.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). That number should be considered low,
however, because injured ducks are more difficult to find than other species. Bob
Marshall, Measuring Number of Dead Ducks Caused By Spill Proves Difficulty, NEW
ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE
(Oct.
3,
2010),
http://www.nola.com/outdoors/index.ssf/2010/10/measuring_number_of_dead_ducks.ht
ml.
103. Both of the available examples were ship groundings in Puerto Rico, where
emergency action was needed to stabilize broken, but still living, coral fragments. See
generally PUBLIC NOTICE, NOTICE OF EMERGENCY RESTORATION ACTION: T/V MARGARA
INCIDENT
–
APRIL
27,
2006
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.marineincidents.com/pr/margara/pdf/MARGARA%20990.26%20Notice%20
of%20ER%20-%20Final%20November%205%202006.pdf.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2.
106. Press Release, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Marine Resources Division, Puerto
Rico’s DNER and NOAA to Initiate Emergency Restoration of Coral Reef Damaged by
Grounding of Oil Tanker (May 15, 2006), available at http://www.marineincidents.com/
pr/margara/pdf/FINAL%20For_Immediate_Release_may15_DRAFT.pdf.
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on restored areas more than a year after the wreck.107 As of 2011, there
has been no Final Restoration Plan.
While the value and importance of emergency restoration projects is
not doubted, the process does have the unfortunate effect of excluding
the public. Trustees are granted much more discretion when choosing
projects under emergency restoration provisions, which exempt such
projects from otherwise-required public notice and comment.108 Unlike
the public comment periods required for draft and final Restoration
Plans, trustees are only required to provide notice to the public—by any
means they see fit—of the planned emergency project.109 It is not until a
reasonable time after the project is completed that trustees must provide
“public notice of the justification for, nature and extent of, and results of
emergency restoration.”110 At that point, of course, the public has no
way to prevent an unpopular project from happening.
In addition to the exclusion of public input, oversight of emergency
restoration actions is further limited by a relatively low burden of proof
on the trustees. Emergency projects are justified in part if they “prevent
or reduce any continuing danger to natural resources”111 and if waiting to
develop a Restoration Plan would merely “increas[e] natural resource
damages.”112 When responding to an incident as large as the Spill, these
low barriers may allow trustees to justify and fund projects with a less
direct connection to the natural resources of the Gulf than is typical of an
OPA NRDA.
The final concern with conducting emergency restoration actions is
that it hinders the ability of trustees to pay for damages that may not yet
be apparent. Many of the environmental effects of the Spill, including
the long-term impacts of oil dispersants, are not yet known.113 Spending
107. See
T/V
Margara
Ground
Incident
Administrative
Record,
MARINEINCIDENTS.COM, http://www.marineincidents.com/pr/margara/admin_record.html
(last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
108. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,483, 61,484 (Oct. 1,
2002) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 990).
109. 15 C.F.R. § 990.26(d) (2010).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 990.26(a)(1) (emphasis added).
112. Id. § 990.26(a)(4).
113. See Bryan Walsh, Oil Spill: Months Later, Questions Remain Over Chemical
Dispersants, TIME (Jan. 27, 2011, 5:56 PM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/
2011/01/27/oil-spill-months-later-questions-remain-over-chemical-dispersants/
(describing a recent study showing that chemical dispersants in the Gulf did not break
down as quickly as scientists expected, and asking whether these dispersants were toxic
to marine life); see also Karen A. Bjorndal et al., Better Science Needed for Restoration
in the Gulf of Mexico, 331 SCI. 537 (2011).
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money on emergency restoration projects now depletes funds that may be
needed for later projects. With the large amount of money expected for
natural resource damages, keeping a close eye on all emergency
restoration projects is recommended to ensure the proper use of funds.
B. Degree of Connection Between Injured Resources and
Restoration Projects
Sums recovered in an OPA NRDA are only permitted to reimburse
costs associated with the assessment of natural resource damages, and to
pay for the development and implementation of plans for the
“restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent”
of the injured natural resources.114 The language is deceptively simple.
“Restore,” “rehabilitate,” “replace” or “acquire the equivalent of” are not
further defined in the OPA or its regulations, and scant case law has not
helped much to define the parameters in which trustees must apply
recovered sums.
The worry, of course, is that money recovered under a NRDA will be
used improperly. It is a concern nearly as old as NRD recovery itself: in
an early CWA NRDA case, the First Circuit stated that “[t]he ultimate
purpose of [a NRDA] should be to protect the public interest in a healthy
functioning environment, and not to provide a windfall to the public
treasury.”115 On the extreme end, this means using recovered sums for
use unrelated to environmental restoration. On the more realistic end, it
means using recovered sums for environmental projects that have little or
no connection to the injured resources. Choosing restoration projects
may be a tough decision for some trustees, especially in situations where
the natural resources have already returned to baseline conditions after
the initial clean-up or through natural processes while the Restoration
plan was pending. In those circumstances, trustees will at least recover
NRD sums for the interim “lost use” of the resources, without a clear
place to spend it.
There has been litigation, however, surrounding the similar “restore,
rehabilitate, replace or acquire the equivalent of” language in CERCLA.
These courts, following the directive of administrative deference
established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,116 allowed trustees wide discretion in determining how to
pursue and use NRD sums. In the first of these CERCLA interpretation
114. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(f) (2006) (referencing 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c)(1)(C)).
115. P.R. v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 676 (1st Cir. 1980).
116. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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cases, Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals found that trustees should seek sums for the restoration of the
injured resource rather than their lost use value, unless restoration is
physically impossible or the cost is grossly disproportionate to the lost
use value.117 This ruling dismantled a previous interpretation, which held
that trustees should pursue whichever option cost less: restoration or lost
use value.
Courts found that Chevron deference also applied to a trustee’s
determination of whether to use recovered sums for “restoration” or
“rehabilitation” or “replacement” or “acquiring the equivalent of” injured
resources. In Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
the state of Montana argued that because “restoration” and
“rehabilitation” result in a “net benefit” to the public, while
“replacement” and “acqui[sition of the] equivalent of [the injured
natural] resources simply transfers into public ownership uninjured
resources,” restoration and rehabilitation should be preferred over
replacement and acquisition.118 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found
to the contrary, ruling that Congress intended no hierarchy, and that
trustees could choose the most appropriate projects they saw fit after
considering benefits and costs.119
The “restore, rehabilitate, replace, acquire” language was first
discussed in 1980, in the context of the CWA. In Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe
Colocotroni,120 the First Circuit affirmed a trustee’s right to pursue the
“acquire the equivalent of” strategy, even if that meant projects
unconnected with the injured resources, such as “comparable lands for
public parks or . . . reforestation of a similar proximate site.”121
Therefore, once deciding to pursue restoration damages, “the trustee can
decide, based on cost, whether to seek damages in an amount that can be
used to attempt to restore the natural resources to their pre-damaged
state, or to acquire the equivalent of the damaged natural resources by
buying up land or by other means.”122
Though such interpretations have not explicitly been extended to the
OPA, the overwhelming similarities in language and intent between the
NRDA processes included in the OPA, CERCLA and the CWA make it
likely that the CERCLA interpretations will bear strong influence on the
117. Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
118. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1229
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Rowley, supra note 17, at 478.
119. Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1231.
120. 628 F.2d 652, 676 (1980).
121. Rowley, supra note 17, at 479-80.
122. Id. at 480.
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OPA. If so, it means that trustees handling the Deepwater Horizon
restoration process will have a lot of leeway in choosing restoration
projects, even if they are far removed from the affected coastline. As
stated above, the first Deepwater Restoration project is taking place
nearly 250 miles north of the Gulf Coast.
The subtlety in the degree of connection between restoration projects
and the injured resources can be illustrated by a case study. In April
2000, a leaking underground pipeline supplying the Potomac Electric
Power Company (PEPCO) in Aquasco, MD was found to have leaked
140,000 gallons of oil into Swanson Creek, a tributary of the Patuxent
River.123 Severe weather quickly spread the oil, eventually fouling
seventeen linear miles of shoreline before being contained.124 The spill
damaged wetlands, beach shorelines, and injured a wide variety of
wildlife, killing more than 600 ruddy ducks, 122 diamondback terrapins,
and more than 5,000 pounds of fish and shellfish.125
Moving more quickly than most NRDAs, PEPCO settled with the
state of Maryland in November 2003, agreeing to pay more than $2.7
million to implement the Restoration Plan.126 “Trustee representatives
met with the Governor’s advisory committee, other local residents and
scientists,” and agreed to restoration projects, which had varying degrees
of connection to Swanson Creek and the Patuxent River.127 Three of the
four “ecological restoration” projects had a direct, physical connection to
the Patuxent: the creation of six acres of intertidal wetland on
Washington Creek, a tributary of the Patuxent; the creation of a new
beach along the river; and the creation of five acres of oyster reef
sanctuary in the river.128
The fourth and final project took place far from Maryland: the
restoration of “ruddy duck nesting habitat by converting marginally
productive agricultural land in the Prairie Pothole Region of the
123. Case: Chalk Point, MD, NOAA’S DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION &
RESTORATION PROGRAM, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/northeast/chalk_point/index.html
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
124. Id.
125. Jonathan McKnight & Lisa Pelstring, Patuxent River Oil Spill Road to Recovery,
MD. DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES, http://www.dnr.state.md.us/naturalresource/
winter2003/oilspill.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
126. Consent Decree at VII(A), United States v. Potomac Electric Power Company
(2002) (No. AW 02CV4013), available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/gc-cd/chalkpointcd.pdf.
127. McKnight & Pelstring, supra note 125.
128. Cleanup and Restoration Highlights at Chalk Point, Maryland, NOAA’S DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION PROGRAM, http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/
northeast /chalk_point/pdf/Chalk_Point_handout.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
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midwestern United States into seasonal wetlands and protecting them
with conservation easements.”129 The spill injured more ruddy ducks
than any other bird species, and the trustees determined that midwestern
nesting improvements were “the only proposed project that [would]
directly restore the injured species.”130 This project was chosen despite
the fact that it is impossible to tell whether the ducks nesting in the
restored habitat would, in fact, winter in Maryland.131
What this means for Deepwater Horizon restoration projects is that
the projects may take place far from the Gulf. For example, the closest
nesting habitats for the northern gannet—the third most-frequently
injured species with 637 birds—are in Maritime Canada and the North
Atlantic.132 Similarly, a project restoring the nesting habitat of the
common loon (106 injured birds) could take place in northern forests
from New England to Alaska.133 The same holds true for any species that
was affected by the spill but may breed outside the Gulf, from the
hundreds of bird species that use the Gulf as a migratory highway to
bottlenose dolphins134 and Kemp’s ridley sea turtles.135
While spending Deepwater Horizon NRDA money outside of the
Gulf may seem contradictory, it is not outside the letter of the statute.
NRDAs exist to restore damaged natural resources, including migratory
wildlife. If the best way to restore, rehabilitate, replace or acquire the
equivalent of a migratory bird is to protect its nesting habitat, then
129. Id.
130. NOAA, FINAL RESTORATION PLAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE
APRIL 7, 2000 OIL SPILL AT CHALK POINT ON THE PATUXENT RIVER, MARYLAND 56 (2002)
available at http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/northeast/chalk_point/pdf/cp2107.pdf.
131. When calculating the proper scale for the project, trustees reduced the site’s
productivity estimate by 30 percent to account for ruddy ducks that would overwinter in
places other than the Chesapeake. Id. at 55. Wintering ruddy ducks can be found along
the American coast from Maryland to Washington and as far south as Central America.
All About Birds – Ruddy Duck, THE CORNELL LAB OF ORNITHOLOGY,
http://www.allaboutbirds.org/guide/Ruddy_Duck/id (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
132. Bird Impact Data, supra note 100; All About Birds – Northern Gannet, THE
CORNELL LAB OF ORNITHOLOGY, http://www.allaboutbirds.org/guide/Northern_Gannet/id
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
133. All About Birds – Common Loon, THE CORNELL LAB OF ORNITHOLOGY,
http://www.allaboutbirds.org/guide/Common_Loon/id (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
134. Bottlenose dolphins live in temperate and tropical oceans around the world.
Bottlenose Dolphin, THE AMERICAN CETACEAN SOCIETY, http://www.acsonline.org/
factpack/btlnose.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
135. Nearly 95 percent of all Kemp’s Ridley Turtles nest on beaches in the Mexican
state of Tamualipas. Kemp’s Ridley Turtle, NOAA FISHERIES OFFICE OF PROTECTED
RESOURCES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/turtles/kempsridley.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2011).
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trustees are well within their right to do so, regardless of where that
habitat is. Note that Deepwater Horizon trustees will still have plenty of
opportunities to protect nesting habitat in oil damaged areas; for instance,
the two most-injured species, laughing gull (3,354 birds) and brown
pelican (932 birds), both nest in the Gulf.136
Further enabling potential abuse by trustees is their ability to settle
with PRPs at any time, even before the completion of the assessment.137
The political pressure that may exist when a PRP is so important to a
local economy, as BP is to that of the Gulf Coast, may result in a
settlement lower than the estimated cost of damaged natural resources.
Such settlements are difficult to challenge in court.138 The OPA is clear,
though, that settlements must be “fair, reasonable, and in the public
interest, with particular consideration of the adequacy of the settlement
to restore, replace, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of the injured
natural resources and services.”139
The public should carefully watch the development of the Deepwater
Horizon restoration plan. While it is clear that the overwhelming body
of funds will be used to restore natural resources located in the Gulf, the
potential exists for enterprising governments to lobby for NRDA money
to rehabilitate wildlife in their own states or countries. While this may
cause an uproar in Gulf states, it is not contrary to the goals of the OPA.
However, making sure that money is spent responsibly and beneficially,
for all projects, requires public vigilance and participation.
C. Disbursement of Funds
Yet another challenge presented by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
lies with the sheer geographical scope of the spill. Spanning five state
jurisdictions as well as federal waters, this particular spill raises unique
considerations of how the NRDA funds, once calculated, should be
distributed throughout the affected areas. The OPA does not speak to
specific apportionment among the parties, but rather tracks the severity
of harm.140 As previously discussed, trustees have considerable latitude

136. Bird Impact Data, supra note 100.
137. 15 C.F.R. § 990.25 (2010).
138. See Murray et al., supra note 43, at 434-35 (claiming that even when challengers
are permitted to intervene, the typical judicial posture is to defer to settlements).
139. 15 C.F.R. § 990.25 (2010).
140. As expressed by the amount needed for “restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or
acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged natural resources.” 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1)(A)
(2006).
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to fund projects outside the impacted area in certain circumstances.141
However, each state would like to see as much of the NRDA funds as
possible return to its state. As a result, the Gulf states have essentially
begun competing with each other over NRDA funds.
Even with the NRDA process in the beginning stages, various states
are already posturing over what percentage of the funds each state should
receive. Strategies vary by state. Initially, all five states were negotiating
interim payments for both natural resource and economic damages with
BP.142 However, this process fell apart for Alabama last fall when the
state filed a lawsuit against BP and Transocean, seeking both economic
and natural resources damages.143 Thereafter, BP refused to issue interim
payments to Alabama, citing the pending litigation.144 Louisiana, on the
other hand, received millions of dollars from BP for restoration projects
in late 2010.145 More recently, Louisiana has requested an emergency
payment for oyster bed restoration designed to provide Louisiana
oystermen with immediate relief.146 Mississippi and Florida have
pursued negotiations and interim funding, although both states have
intimated their willingness to pursue litigation if necessary.147 Like
Louisiana, Mississippi recently began work on an emergency restoration
project aimed at duck habitat restoration in Rolling Fork, Mississippi.148
Likely, these interim restoration payments will correspondingly offset
any final restoration payment by BP.
In addition to state competition for restoration funds, several
environmental groups are seeking restoration funding for Gulf wildlife

141. See supra pp. 10-12.
142. Donna Leinwand, States Tally Oil Spill Toll to Send BP Their Bills, USA TODAY,
Sept. 29, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-09-29-gulfstateclaims29_
ST_N.htm.
143. Complaint, State of Alabama v. BP, No. 1:2010-cv-00331 (S.D. Ala. June 28,
2010).
144. Jeff Amy, BP Refuses to Pay Alabama’s Oil Spill Claim, Citing Lawsuit,
ALABAMA PRESS-REGISTER, Sept. 16, 2010, http://blog.al.com/live/2010/09/bp_
refuses_to_pay_alabamas_oil.html.
145. BP to Give State $218 Million for Coastal Restoration, Seafood Testing, Tourism,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 1, 2010, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oilspill/index.ssf/2010/11/gov_jindal_announces_millions.html ($140 million for barrier
island and coastal restoration efforts).
146. State Presses BP for Damaged-Oyster Money, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Feb.
10, 2011, http://www.sunherald.com/2011/02/10/2853092/state-presses-bp-for-damagedoyster.html.
147. Leinwand, supra note 142.
148. See supra pp. 8-9.
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through an Endangered Species Act (ESA) lawsuit filed against BP.149
While this litigation is brought under the ESA, much of the requested
relief mirrors that which NRDA is designed to address.150 Specifically,
litigants seek, among other things, “restoration of ecosystem
components” and “a permanent endowment dedicated to the long-term
restoration.”151 If these litigants are successful, the correlation between
NRDA funding and funds established through this litigation will remain
unclear. Arguably, the sought-after relief is, in many ways, duplicative
to restoration through the NRDA process, which is expressly prohibited
by the OPA.152
D. Legal Costs
Navigating the NRDA process for State Trustees can be a potentially
unwieldy and consuming process. For a variety of reasons, a state may
retain outside legal counsel with specialized expertise to represent its
interests in the process.153 As set forth below, the OPA allows states to
recoup legal costs incurred during the NRDA process.154 But what
happens when a state contracts with outside counsel on a contingency fee
basis?
Through regulation, legal costs under the OPA are defined as “the
costs of attorney actions performed for the purpose of assessment or
developing a restoration plan” in accordance with the NRDA process.155
When attorneys’ actions fall within specified criteria, those actions “are
deemed assessment costs.”156
For attorneys’ fees to constitute
149. Complaint, Defenders of Wildlife v. BP, No. 2:10-cv-03879 (E.D. La. Sept. 10,
2010).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 19.
152. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(3) (2006) (there shall be no double recovery under the OPA
for natural resources damages).
153. For instance, Alabama initially retained outside counsel to handle its lawsuit for
economic and natural resources damages. More recently, however, the Alabama
Attorney General has dismissed outside counsel and assumed the role of lead counsel.
One of his stated reasons for this action was to save Alabama taxpayers legal costs,
saying in an interview with Reuters Legal: “I’m not going to give any law firm 15-20
percent of the money due the people of the state of Alabama.” See Alabama Attorney
General Fires Law Firms Handling BP Case, WESTLAW NEWS & INSIGHT, Jan. 27, 2011,
http://westlawnews.thomson.com/National_Litigation/News/2011/01__January/Alabama_attorney_general_fires_law_firms_handling_BP_case/.
154. 15 C.F.R. § 990.30 (2010).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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assessment costs, the attorneys’ actions must 1) comprise assessment or
restoration planning activities under OPA section 1006(c); 2) occur
before litigation is filed on behalf of a trustee to recover damages; and 3)
be performed by an attorney working on behalf of a trustee agency rather
than a prosecutorial agency.157 If the action fails to meet all three
criteria, a trustee must justify “why the action was not performed for the
primary purpose of furthering litigation in order to support a
characterization of the action as an assessment action.”158 Common
assessment actions include, but are not limited to, advising trustees on
the requirements of the OPA, preparing public notices and maintaining
administrative records, and preparing binding agreements between the
parties.159 In other words, outside counsel’s actions incurred in the
furtherance of litigation, particularly on behalf of an attorney general,
cannot be recovered as assessment costs under NRDA.
As noted by others in the context of the CERCLA, “contingent fee
[natural resource damage] cases raise novel legal issues.”160 Like the
OPA, CERCLA allows for the recovery of natural resource damages.161
Once recovered, CERCLA expressly requires that funds be available “for
use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural
resources.”162 The OPA similarly restricts the use of NRDA funds to
costs incurred in the damage assessment itself, in the development of a
restoration plan, and in the implementation of corresponding activities to
achieve “restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the
equivalent, of the natural resources.”163 The question becomes whether
paying outside firms on a contingency basis violates the restrictions on
use of NRDA funds.
Courts have yet to consider this question in the context of the OPA,
but states employing this arrangement under CERCLA have generated
substantial controversy.164
Criticisms include assertions that the
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Peter L. Gray, The Rise of Natural Resource Damage Claims States and Plaintiffs’
Attorneys Leading the Charge, 9 No. 2 ABA ENVTL. LITIG. & TOXIC TORTS COMMITTEE
NEWSL. 3 (2007).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2006). Under CERCLA, natural resources are defined as
“land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other
such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise
controlled by the United States . . . any State or local government, any foreign
government, any Indian tribe . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (2006).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2006).
163. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(c), (f) (2006).
164. Gray, supra note 160, at 4.
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arrangement violates the public trust doctrine and state fiduciary
duties.165 Even where state law permits contingency fee arrangements,
judicial interpretations under CERCLA suggest that the OPA preempts
any state statutory authorization for contingency fee payments.166
Considering similar language under CERCLA, the Tenth Circuit held
that the statutory natural resource damage scheme “preempts any state
remedy designed to achieve something other than the restoration,
replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent of a contaminated natural
resource.”167 The court expressly rejected the use of natural resource
damage monies for the payment of attorneys’ fees.168 The court did,
however, suggest that use of monies received specifically as awards of
state law claims, such as negligence and nuisance, would not be
preempted, but only to the extent that those monies were separate from
natural resource damage monies.169 If the Tenth Circuit’s analysis is
applied to OPA NRDA litigation, states may wish to reconsider
employing outside counsel on contingency fee arrangements.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the OPA’s NRDA provisions will play a
major role in helping natural resources injured by the Spill return to
health. The development of NRDA provisions is remarkable because
they provide damages to the resources themselves—victims that are
otherwise unable to advocate for themselves. However, including
natural resource damage provisions in the statute is only the first step in
ensuring that natural resources are restored. As the owners and
beneficiaries of natural resources, the public must remain involved and
vigilant throughout the NRDA process to ensure that the money is being
used properly, with particular attention paid to the use of emergency
funds, the degree of connection between the injured resources and
restoration projects, the disbursement of funds, and legal fees. If proper
care is paid, there is no reason that the Deepwater Horizon NRDA cannot
reduce the environmental effects of that terrible spill to memories.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. New Mexico v. Gen. Electric Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1247 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
Gray, supra note 160, at 7.
168. Gen. Electric, 467 F.3d at 1248.
169. Id.

